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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is in an exciting period of reform. In February
2013, participating states announced plans to lower RGGI’s cap on carbon dioxide emissions by 45% in
2014. At the same time, RGGI states made a commitment to work towards a solution to address the
emissions from electricity imports into the region. Given that imports make up between 10 and 52% of
RGGI states’ electricity consumption, and that these percentages may increase under a tightened
emissions cap, it is a critical time to delve more deeply into the options available to RGGI to deal with
imports’ emissions.
This white paper evaluates the legal workability and constitutionality of what is frequently
considered the most feasible mechanism for RGGI to use in regulating imports: an obligation on RGGI
“load serving entities” (LSEs)—those companies responsible for supplying electricity to end-use
customers—to purchase allowances to account for the emissions associated with the electricity they sell
that is imported. Ultimately, although there are many design complexities yet to be worked out, we find
that an LSE-centered approach could present a viable pathway forward for RGGI states’ regulation of
imports. It is likely to create long-term price signals about the value of clean energy and to help prevent
emissions “leakage.” And importantly, an LSE-centered mechanism has a good chance of being found
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and Federal Power Act preemption. However, an
LSE-centered approach also has some features that may be considered drawbacks: it would likely increase
consumer prices within RGGI without sending any immediate price signals to out-of-state generators to
incentivize their emissions reductions (instead, such price signals will develop over time as new clean
generation and demand-side resources come on-line). Given these features, RGGI states will want to think
carefully about whether an LSE-centered imports mechanism accomplishes their goals.
This white paper is organized into three sections, for which the major conclusions are summarized below.
Design: Designing LSE-centered imports regulations will be a complex, but achievable, endeavor. Some
key issues include:
•

•

•

•

Defining Covered Entities: States will have to determine how to define LSE compliance
obligations and what legislative and/or regulatory changes to state law will be necessary to
impose obligations on LSEs.
Tracking Emissions Associated with Imports: Collaboration between states and wholesale market
operators will be critical in designing a methodology for tracking imports’ emissions, and the
existence of wholesale markets will necessitate creating an average emissions factor to be applied
to purchases of “system power” that cannot be traced back to a particular plant.
Assigning Compliance Obligations to LSEs: States will need to devise a fair methodology for
determining LSE compliance obligations, particularly in the states of Maryland and Delaware
where participation in a larger, regional wholesale market complicates the question of tracking
“imported” power into these states.
Preventing Gaming of the System: In order to prevent firms from reassigning their clean power
for sale into the RGGI region and their dirtier power for sale elsewhere without actually changing
their emissions profile, “resource shuffling” rules will be necessary.
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Predicted Effects: This paper makes some educated predictions as to how LSEs are likely to respond to
the imposition of imports regulations, in order to lay the groundwork for a robust constitutional analysis.
•

•

•

In the short term: LSEs will comply with the new obligations either by purchasing allowances to
accompany their purchases of imported “system power,” or will turn from the wholesale market
to bilateral contracting with in-state generators and/or cleaner out-of-state generators (to the
extent permitted by resource shuffling regulations and relevant state laws).
In the longer term: LSEs will comply with the new obligations by entering into contracts with
new, cleaner generators that are incentivized by the regulations to come on-line both in- and outof-region, and customers will be incentivized to invest in more demand-side management as a
result of seeing higher electricity prices.
Effects felt out of state: In general, the effects felt out of state in the short term are expected to be
relatively small. Out-of-state generators will face no compliance burdens and are not likely to
experience major incentives to reduce emissions, as they will continue selling into wholesale
markets that award all generators the market clearing price and impose average emissions
assumptions. In the longer term, imports regulations should cause out-of-region generators to
face increased competition from new renewable generation and demand-side solutions, as is the
case for in-RGGI generation.

Constitutionality: The primary aim of this paper is to determine whether the envisioned mechanism and
its effects can withstand constitutional scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause and Federal Power
Act preemption. Although the application of these doctrines to state climate regulations is a novel and
evolving topic, we conclude that an LSE-centered mechanism has a good chance of being upheld as
constitutional. Key takeaways from our analysis include:
•

•

•

•

Dormant Commerce Clause Discrimination: LSE-centered regulations should be found nondiscriminatory because they are fundamentally not protectionist regulations—to the contrary, they
impose far greater burdens on in-state generators than out-of-state generators would face.
However, this conclusion is subject to many caveats and nuances explored in our analysis.
Extraterritoriality: Because LSE-centered regulations place no burdens on out-of-state generators
and are unlikely even to provide them with pronounced price incentives, the regulations should
not be found to operate extraterritorially.
Pike Balancing: The notoriously subjective Pike balancing inquiry asks whether the burdens of a
regulation on out-of-state entities are clearly excessive when compared to the regulation’s in-state
benefits. Although it is difficult to predict how a court would weigh in-state climate benefits
under the Pike test, the burden and standard of proof favor a finding upholding imports
regulations.
The Federal Power Act: The Federal Power Act grants the federal government exclusive control
over wholesale power rates, and it might be argued that imports regulations encroach on this
authority. However, this argument seems unlikely to prevail, given that the Act also preserves
states’ traditional regulatory authority. Imports regulations would not dictate wholesale power
rates, but would impose burdens on LSEs analogous to renewable portfolio standards and other
permissible state environmental regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is in an exciting period of reform. Participating
states have used the scheduled 2012 review to transform RGGI into a more effective program going
forward. In February 2013, as part of a suite of reforms, RGGI states announced plans to lower RGGI’s
cap on carbon dioxide emissions by 45% in 2014.1 At the same time, RGGI states made a commitment
“to identifying and evaluating potential tracking tools for emissions associated with electricity imported
into the RGGI region, leading to a workable, practicable, and legal mechanism to address such
emissions.”2
Imports into the RGGI region comprise a non-negligible portion of the total electricity consumed
by the region. They make up approximately 16% of New York’s electricity and around 10% of New
England’s. 3 It is more difficult to measure the exact net amount that Maryland and Delaware—the two
most southern RGGI states—import, given their participation a larger electricity market that includes
many non-RGGI states. However, estimates were given that Maryland sources approximately 40% of its
power from out-of-state, and Delaware 52%. As these numbers reflect, much of the electricity currently
consumed within RGGI states comes from other places, making the inclusion of imports’ emissions
within the RGGI program an important element of capturing and reducing all of RGGI states’ electricityrelated carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Regulating imports may gain added importance as RGGI’s
tightening of its cap pushes up allowance prices and potentially causes a turn towards importing more
power.
This White Paper aims to help states in their commitment to finding a workable, legal method for
regulating emissions associated with electricity imported into the RGGI region. It does so by evaluating
one of the primary design mechanisms being contemplated by RGGI for use in regulating imports: an
obligation on “load serving entities” (LSEs)—those companies responsible for supplying electricity to
end-use customers—to purchase allowances to account for the emissions associated with the electricity
they sell that is imported. An LSE-centered option is not the only one that RGGI might pursue, although
some analysts suggest it is the most practicable approach given the characteristics of the region.4 We do
not consider here alternative design options, such as California’s “first deliverer” approach,5 which might
present different legal and policy considerations, although some of our analysis here would be
transferable.
1

RGGI, Inc., Press Release, RGGI States Propose Lowering Regional CO2 Emissions Cap 45, Implementing a More
Flexible Cost Control Mechanism (Feb. 7, 2013), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/PR130207_ModelRule.pdf.
2
Id.
3
See Energy Sources in New England, ISO-NE, at http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/enrgy_srcs/ (last visited
May 6, 2013); NYISO, 2012 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, at 41 (Potomac Economics April 2013).
4
See David Farnsworth & Rachael Terada, Tracking Emissions Associated with Energy Serving Load in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 53 (Regulatory Assistance Project, Apr. 2013), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6509.
5
California’s “first deliverer” policy imposes a compliance obligation on whoever first delivers electricity to the
California grid, be it a generator, a wholesale power marketer, or an LSE. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 95102(a)(174)
(“‘First deliverer of electricity’ or ‘first deliver’ means the operator of an electricity generating facility in California
or an electricity importer.”). The regulations define “electricity importers” as “the purchasing-selling entity (PSE)
on the last segment of the [NERC e-]tag's physical path with the point of receipt located outside the state of
California and the point of delivery located inside the state of California.” Id. § 95102(a)(140).
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Ultimately, although there are many design complexities yet to be worked out, we find that an
LSE-centered approach could present a viable pathway forward for RGGI states’ regulation of imports.
Importantly, an LSE-centered scheme has a good chance of being found constitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause and Federal Power Act preemption.6
One additional conclusion emerges from our analysis of an LSE-centered approach to regulating
imports. A well-designed LSE approach can deliver on the promise of reducing the emissions associated
with electricity consumed in the RGGI region, can send long-term price signals about the value of clean
energy, and can serve to help prevent emissions “leakage.” It is not, however, likely to provide a direct
price signal to existing out-of-state generators to incentivize their emissions reductions, for reasons
explained in our analysis. Put otherwise, an LSE-centered scheme is likely to “level the playing field” in
terms of LSE purchasing choices, but will not immediately “level the playing field” between in- and outof-state generators. Accordingly, RGGI states may want to think carefully about what the goals of
imports regulations are, and whether the incentives created through an LSE scheme will serve their
purposes.
The paper is organized into three sections. Section I discusses the potential design and administration
of imports regulations. Section II sketches the likely effects of implementing these regulations. Section
III subjects the scheme and its potential effects to legal scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause and
Federal Power Act preemption.
I.

DESIGNING AN IMPORTS REGULATION SCHEME

The first reasonable question to ask when considering regulating LSEs for the emissions associated
with electricity imports is: can it be done, from a practical perspective? To ensure environmental
integrity and effectiveness, the regulations will have to accomplish the complicated tasks of tracking and
assigning emissions to imported power, as well as preventing any gaming of the rules established. This
challenge will be particularly pronounced in the PJM region–a regional electricity market that includes
two RGGI states, Maryland and Delaware, as well as 11 non-participating states—where it is not easy to
monitor “imports” into RGGI, given that only a small portion of the region participates in RGGI.
We believe that despite complications that merit careful attention and potential compromise,
workable imports regulations are possible. In this part, we work through some of the key administrative
and technical issues that RGGI will face in designing and implementing LSE imports regulations.
a. DEFINING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION
The scheme we are considering would, in general, place a compliance obligation upon LSEs, a term
which we use here to describe those entities responsible for selling power to retail end users.7 A few
further details bear consideration.

6

This paper does not consider the separate issue of whether there may be any additional, foreign commerce-related
legal challenges raised by the fact that some RGGI imports come from Canada.
7
Cf. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Rate Schedule FERC No. 44 (Jan. 4, 2013) (“Load Serving Entity or LSE shall
mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i)
Footnote continued on next page
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Most RGGI states have restructured retail electricity markets, wherein retail electricity supply occurs
competitively (although in most states, the default service provider—typically a historically regulated
utility—still provides service to a large percentage of customers). In these states, compliance obligations
would most likely attach to electricity sales by all electricity suppliers, including retail suppliers (similar
to many states’ current practice of imposing RPS compliance obligations on these suppliers8). Retail
customers would likely bear the burden of compliance costs, as retail suppliers would probably pass along
the cost of any obligations placed on them to consumers. However, retail suppliers should have an
incentive to minimize compliance costs under the basic theory of a competitive marketplace: if certain
retail suppliers were able to manage RGGI compliance obligations more cost-effectively than others, such
that they kept total electricity costs lower for consumers, consumers might switch from more expensive
retail suppliers to these market leaders.
In non-restructured states,9 placing the compliance obligation on LSEs—as opposed to on end users,
with LSEs merely obligated to act as an administrator—might help keep compliance costs as low as
possible. Because regulated LSEs have their costs subjected to prudence review, there would be a certain
amount of regulatory pressure to minimize the costs of complying with RGGI obligations in order to
prove that costs were “prudently incurred.”
There may also be questions about how broadly the compliance obligation should extend. If full
coverage is desired, compliance obligations should include all end users, or entities serving all end users,
including rural cooperatives, municipal utilities, and other similarly situated entities. Ultimately, each
RGGI state will have to determine for itself what its options are for defining the compliance obligation,
and different treatment in different states may well be acceptable. States might draw upon their
experiences creating Renewable Portfolio Standard compliance burdens in order to take advantage of the
familiarity those covered entities have in meeting analogous obligations.
LSEs would be assigned a compliance obligation based on the emissions associated with the imported
power consumed by their customers, and would be responsible for purchasing allowances to cover these
emissions. The ways in which LSEs’ particular compliance obligations would be calculated are discussed
in more detail below in Section I(b). LSEs should already have the ability to participate in RGGI auctions
to purchase allowances.10 It may be more complicated to add them as covered entities under various state

Footnote continued from previous page

serving end-users . . ., and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law,
regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users . . . Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use
customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power
and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.”).
8
See, e.g., MD. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 7-703 (applying the state’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard to “all retail
electricity sales in the State by electricity suppliers”).
9
Vermont is the only non-restructured state within RGGI. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, Energy
Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited August 16,
2013).
10
See RGGI, CO2 Allowance Auctions: Frequently Asked Questions, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Auctions/20/RGGI_%20CO2_%20Allowance_%20Auction_%20FAQs_Apr_08_2013.pd
f (“[A]t this time, all parties are eligible to participate in CO2 allowance auctions, including but not limited to
corporations, individuals, non-profit corporations, environmental organizations, brokers, and other interested
parties.”).
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laws. This paper does not analyze the changes that would be necessary in each state’s laws, but if RGGI
proceeds with imports regulations, this would be an important area for further inquiry.
One additional important question with respect to assigning LSEs compliance obligations is whether
or not RGGI needs to adjust its cap in order to bring LSEs within the ambit of covered entities. If the cap
is not adjusted, imports regulations would serve to increase the stringency of RGGI’s targets by applying
the same cap to a larger quantity of sources.
b. TRACKING AND ASSIGNING EMISSIONS
Imports regulations will necessitate the ability to track CO2 emissions from generators sending
load into the RGGI states and to apportion these emissions obligations among RGGI LSEs. Although
utilizing and reforming existing electricity tracking systems in order to accomplish these goals will entail
some complexities, we believe the Regulatory Assistance Project’s (“RAP’s”) recent paper provides a
workable methodology for moving forward in this regard.11 We explain and summarize this
methodology, as well as point out some of the key areas meriting further discussion, below.
Tracking CO2 Emissions by Using “Attributes” and an “Adjusted Residual Mix”
The RGGI states are part of three Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission
Organizations (ISOs/RTOs) that control electricity transmission and wholesale power markets across the
RGGI region: ISO-New England (ISO-NE), the New York ISO (NYISO), and PJM (which includes
Maryland and Delaware, along with 11 non-participating states). Importantly, these ISOs/RTOs have
already developed capabilities to track Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) to measure compliance with
state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which could form the backbone of a more robust emissions
tracking system for CO2. ISO-NE uses the Generation Information System (GIS), PJM the Generation
Attribute Tracking System (GATS), and NYISO is currently developing a new system to be modeled
along similar lines.12
These systems function by separately tracking actual generation and that generation’s
“attributes.” For each megawatt-hour (MWh) of energy produced, one attribute is also produced. If the
source is renewable, the attribute is a REC. This attribute can then be traded separately from the energy
itself. Although currently only attributes with a REC status are traded (as the purpose of tracking
attributes is for the moment only to ensure compliance with RPS), the attribute tracking system also
contains data on generator location and emissions, among other things. Therefore, these attributes are
capable of being used to track CO2 emissions.

11

See David Farnsworth & Rachael Terada, Tracking Emissions Associated with Energy Serving Load in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Regulatory Assistance Project, Apr. 2013), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6509 [hereinafter “RAP Report”]. We thank the authors for their
excellent and thorough analysis, from which much in the following subsections is drawn.
12
NYISO’s current MIS system is not capable of tracking attributes separate from electricity. Recent New York
legislation requires that MIS become capable of tracking attributes. See 2012 Session Laws of N.Y. Ch. 436, L.
2012, codified at N.Y. Pub. Auth L. § 1854(19) (2012).
For purposes of our analysis, we assume that NYISO will proceed with developing a system capable of tracking
generation attributes to the same extent as GIS and GATS.
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If all electricity were bought and sold through bilateral contracts, existence of this attribute
tracking system alone would prove sufficient to track the emissions associated with imports purchased by
RGGI LSEs. But RGGI states are part of restructured electricity markets, where a significant portion of
power comes through spot market purchases, “which are a mix of system power that includes both lowand high-emitting units.”13 Accordingly, it is necessary to construct a methodology for assigning LSEs
emissions attributes to accompany the “system power” that they purchase from wholesale markets. RAP
has proposed that this be done through creating what is, in essence, an average reflecting the entire
emissions of the system power (minus separately tracked renewables), which can be apportioned to LSEs
based on the MWh of system power they purchase.
RAP proposes to do this through creation of what it terms an “adjusted residual mix.” 14 The
“system mix” is the weighted average of all attributes produced in a region. The system mix contains
emissions profiles of some plants that already have accounted for their emissions via RECs. These need to
be netted out, and are removed from the calculation.15 Subtracting out REC attributes produces what is
called a “residual mix.” A residual mix describes the average amount of CO2 produced in a control region
per MWh after removing RECs. To accurately reflect RGGI’s existing compliance requirements, the
residual mix needs to be further adjusted: it contains some generators whose emissions are already
covered by allowances, like RGGI generators, or whose emissions that are excluded from RGGI, like
<25MW plants. To reflect the fact that these generators already have purchased allowances for all their
associated emissions, the emissions attribute for power from these generators is adjusted to zero
emissions (otherwise, their emissions would be double-counted, once at the source and again in
determining the system’s average mix). Then, these zero-emissions sources are averaged with the
remaining system power, thereby creating the “adjusted residual mix,” which reflects the fact that some of
the power fed into the system comes from RGGI generators, while some does not. Finally, net imports
from adjacent ISOs/RTOs are accounted for, based on that region’s adjusted residual mix. What is left is
all power production in the region, except for renewable, contained within the adjusted residual mix.
Thus, this mix reflects the average CO2 emissions associated with each MWh of wholesale system power
subject to RGGI.
A simplified example may serve to clarify this concept. Assume there is a coal-fired generator in
NY and the exact same coal-fired generator in PA. Each produces one ton of CO2 per MWh, and each
sells 1000 MWh into the NYISO wholesale market. The adjusted residual mix (assuming for simplicity’s
sake that these are the entirety of NYISO sales for a certain period) will include 1 ton/MWh from the PA
plant, plus zero tons/MWh from the NY plant, given that the NY plant will have acquired RGGI
allowances to account for its emissions. Together, this weighted average will result in an adjusted
residual mix of .5 tons/MWh. How this is then applied to LSEs is discussed in the next subsection.
13

RGGI, Potential Emissions Leakage and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Final Report of the RGGI
Emissions Leakage Multi-State Staff Working Group to the RGGI Agency Heads, at 6 (March 2008).
14
See RAP report, page 26, for a fuller description of the Adjusted Residual Mix.
15
There is one complicating factor to simply netting out RECS: Because RECs are awarded to “renewable” power—
a category that, depending on state rules, may not all be carbon-free power—there is arguably a need to require
LSEs to acquire some carbon allowances even for that power for which they hold RECs. If states choose to proceed
with imports regulations, this topic merits further exploration and discussion. In resolving this issue, care should be
taken to ensure that in-state and out-of-state renewable generators are treated comparably in order to avoid
constitutional violations.
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Calculating LSE Compliance Obligations
RGGI LSEs source their power through a combination of bilateral contracts and wholesale power
purchases (and some self-generation, though not much given that most RGGI states are restructured).
GATs, GIS, and New York’s MIS systems can tell state regulators how many MWh each LSE purchased
during a given period. LSEs can provide information about that power which came from bilateral
contracts, which can be assigned a compliance obligation based on the characteristics of the generator the
power was purchased from. LSEs may also have purchased RECs to comply with state RPS, which will
essentially transform a corresponding portion of their power purchases into renewable power. However,
as noted supra note 15, states may still want to assign some carbon obligation to this REC-associated
power, given that not all renewable sources are carbon-free. The remaining MWh purchased by an LSE
would be presumed to be system power, and would be assigned the adjusted residual mix value.
Therefore, to continue our simplified example from above, assume that a NY LSE purchased all
the system power created by the two coal plants in NY and PA – 2000 MWh. Its compliance obligation
would be 2000 MWh * .5 tons/MWh (the adjusted residual mix) = 1000 tons CO2 emissions (the same
amount emitted by the PA plant, which is the desired result, as the NY plant already purchased RGGI
allowances to cover its emissions).
Adjusted Residual Mix in PJM
One important consideration worth frankly discussing is that the crafting of LSE obligations based on
the “adjusted residual mix” methodology will have differing impacts in the three ISO/RTOs. In
particular, Maryland and Delaware’s position within PJM complicates their RGGI compliance
obligations, as they do not have RTO wholesale market boundaries that align with RGGI boundaries, as
do ISO-NE and NYISO. PJM’s adjusted residual mix can be expected to be higher than NYISO’s or ISONE’s, given that the mix will include a high percentage of non-RGGI power and power coming from
more coal-intensive states. Under the adjusted residual mix methodology, Maryland and Delaware LSEs
would be assigned a compliance obligation based on these PJM-wide averages, which would not make
any assumptions that the power produced within Maryland or Delaware was consumed by those states.
Whether this is a fair result is a policy judgment.
If it were determined that this burden were too high, it might be possible to adjust these states’
obligations. For example, it could simply be assumed that 100% (or any other negotiated percentage) of
power sold by Delaware and Maryland generators into the wholesale market is actually consumed instate, even though this number cannot be directly tracked. These MWh could then be apportioned among
Maryland and Delaware LSEs to reduce their compliance obligations. Whether this solution might raise
additional legal uncertainty is discussed infra Section III.
c. PREVENTING GAMING OF THE SYSTEM16
If LSE compliance obligations were imposed as described above with no further restrictions, it
would create a natural tendency to “game” the system. Because bilateral contracts avoid having the
adjusted residual mix applied, and instead have obligations assigned based on actual emissions, LSEs
16

For further details, see RAP report, page 59.
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would naturally seek to contract bilaterally with every generator outside the region that was cleaner than
average.
If this were allowed, generators in non-RGGI states could simply indicate—on paper—that they
were selling all their cleaner energy (be it nuclear, hydro, wind, etc.) to a RGGI LSE, while selling their
fossil energy outside the RGGI region, without actually changing their overall emissions profile.
Obviously, this would result in RGGI failing to reduce overall CO2 emissions associated with electricity
consumed in the region.
To prevent this “resource shuffling” from undermining the goal of reducing RGGI CO2
emissions, RAP recommends that RGGI adopt restrictions on the ability of LSEs to have their bilateral
contracts with out-of-RGGI generators recognized as “specified” bilateral contracts for compliance
purposes.17 “Specified” bilateral contracts would be permitted only in three circumstances:
1. A historical contract with a specific power plant and a specific path to delivery
2. A purchase of power from a newly developed resource
3. A purchase of incremental power at an existing power plant
Limiting recognition of bilateral contracts to these circumstances should prevent resource shuffling while
allowing RGGI to incentivize new, clean generation both inside and outside the RGGI region.18
Potential complications arise with respect to how to operationalize these general restrictions. In
particular, many questions have been raised about how historical contracts could be demonstrated.
Proving a historical contract in a long-since restructured region that has changed its production profile
since deregulation could be onerous, and in some cases impossible. For example, the trend of natural gas
displacing coal in the past ten years means that new natural gas plants may have only sold to the
wholesale market, and never had bilateral contracts. While it would not be problematic for scheme
functionality if limited historical contracts could be proven, it might hurt the palatability of the scheme for
participating LSEs. For this reason, RGGI may want to consider building flexibility into the methods
LSEs are allowed to use to demonstrate historical bilateral contracts. Consultation with LSEs in
designing these rules would be advisable.
It is worth noting that California has already encountered challenges with how to design clear,
fair resource shuffling regulations, and is due to release updated regulations soon.19 Its experience in
crafting these rules could be instructive for RGGI, should it choose to proceed down this path.
d. GETTING THE SYSTEMS THERE
Implementation of the tracking scheme described above will require some reforms of existing
systems. State regulators will need to work collaboratively with GATS, GIS, and New York’s new
17

Note that there would not be an actual limitation placed on entering these contracts. Rather, the restriction would
be on the contract’s recognition for purposes of RGGI compliance.
18
There is also a question about whether resource shuffling rules should require LSEs to declare as “specified” any
bilateral contracts for dirtier-than-average imports. We do not know whether there is an appreciable amount of
power currently imported on these terms.
19
See Cal. Air. Res. Bd., Resolution 12-51, at 3 (Oct. 18, 2012).

7

equivalent to implement necessary changes, including ensuring the use of the best emissions data and
aligning various timing requirements. RAP’s recent technical paper describes at length the potential data
sources that RGGI might use and the modifications necessary to ensure regulator access to high quality
data.20 We do not delve into these issues in detail here, except to note that none of them appears to
present an insurmountable hurdle, assuming the ISOs/RTOs are cooperative. And importantly, the
necessary data can all be acquired without mandating self-reporting by out-of-state generators to RGGI
regulators, eliminating any concern that there might be constitutional hurdles presented in data
acquisition.
e. LINE LOSS
RGGI will also have to decide whether to address line loss in its imports regulations.21 All
electricity transmittance causes a portion of the power to be lost as heat. Inside the RGGI region,
generators pay for allowances based on the CO2 intensity of MWh produced. Due to line losses, the total
number of MWh purchased by RGGI LSEs is less than the total number of MWh generated by generators.
In other words, the generators purchase allowances to cover the emissions from more MWh than are
actually delivered to LSEs, thereby effectively accounting for line losses inside the RGGI system.
To accomplish true parity, an imports regulation scheme would also want to account for line
losses in some fashion. While line losses could not be directly measured for all imports and vary due to a
host of complicating factors including distance, time of day, weather, and system congestion, a small
percent of line loss can always be assumed—in the United States, the average is six percent.22
Accordingly, if a RGGI LSE purchases 100 MWh from the system, an out-of-state generator may have
actually produced 106 MWh of electricity to deliver 100 MWh to the LSE at the point of sale. If LSEs
compliance obligations are based on sales data, regulators might want to require them to “gross-up” their
allowance purchase requirement for imports in order to account for the emissions associated with the
MWh lost between generation and purchase. Whether this line loss gross-up would add any legal risk to
the scheme is discussed infra Section III.
f.

DESIGN CONCLUSIONS

We believe there is a path forward for designing workable LSE-centered imports regulations,
should RGGI choose to pursue an LSE-centered approach. It will be most challenging to determine
precisely how these regulations should function in the PJM region, but a compromise that makes certain
assumptions in order to treat Maryland and Delaware LSEs and consumers fairly should be achievable.

20

See RAP Report at 29 et seq.
See page 36 of the RAP report for its treatment of line losses.
22
See Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses, World Bank, at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS (last visited May 1, 2013).
21
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II.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF OUTLINED SCHEME

In order to perform a robust legal analysis, it is first necessary to understand what the practical effects
of the scheme outlined above might be. It is, of course, difficult to predict with certainty the ways in
which various entities will react to the obligations and incentives created by imports regulations, so what
follows are our best guesses about some of the likely consequences.
It first bears noting that, separate and apart from whether imports regulations are adopted, RGGI’s
current imposition of allowance obligations on in-state generators has effects that reverberate through the
ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM wholesale markets. As a general matter, the predictable effect of requiring instate generation to buy allowances is that wholesale market prices may increase, as generators will face
added costs, will include these into the prices they bid into the market, and will thereby drive up the
market clearing price (at least to the extent that the marginal unit in the market is a RGGI-affected unit).23
It can further be expected that as RGGI lowers its cap, allowance prices will increase, causing wholesale
market price increases as well.24 However, to the extent RGGI proceeds continue to be heavily invested
in clean energy and energy efficiency, or to the extent that price increases spur similar investments, such
investments will have a mitigating effect on any price increases.25 Indeed, one recent report finds that
RGGI-funded investments in energy efficiency made between 2009 and 2011 will lower prices over time
and ultimately save customers a net $1.1 billion.26 Predicting the magnitude and direction of future
wholesale price impacts due to a lowered cap is beyond the scope of this paper, but might be a fruitful
area for further inquiry.
As described above, RGGI imports regulations will place a compliance obligation on in-region LSEs
to hold an allowance for each ton of emissions associated with imported electricity. This obligation
extends both to imports purchased through the wholesale market, and imports purchased via bilateral
contract (though in practice, this latter category is reported to be very small). LSEs will not be
responsible for acquiring allowances for electricity purchased from specified in-state sources (because
such sources will have already acquired allowances to cover their emissions) or clean sources (because
they have no emissions).
The next question is, what are an LSE’s compliance options? LSEs have many, some of which may
be easier to adopt than others in the short term. They can: (1) purchase allowances; (2) shift purchases
from the wholesale market to bilateral contracts with existing in-region generators; (3) enter into specified
23

See, e.g., N.Y. State Energy Plan 2009, Electricity Assessment: Resources and Markets, at 17 (2009), available at
http://www.nysenergyplan.com/final/Electricity_Assessment_Resource_and_Markets.pdf; see also ISO New
England Press Release, Estimate of Connecticut’s Generator Tax on New England’s Wholesale Energy Prices (June
6, 2011) (finding that a $2.50 tax on generators imposed by Connecticut might lead to up to a $0.44/MWh increase
in the average annual New England wholesale electricity price).
24
Although the possibility has been raised that this impact of RGGI upon wholesale prices might itself create a
Federal Power Act preemption issue, it is not one that we analyze here, as this is a feature of the existing scheme,
not of imports regulations.
25
See U.S. EPA, ASSESSING THE MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF CLEAN ENERGY: A RESOURCE FOR STATES, at 4 (EPA-430R-11-014 Sept. 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/epa_assessing_benefits.pdf.
26
PAUL J. HIBBARD ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON TEN
NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES, at 34 (Analysis Group, Nov. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Economic_Impact_RGGI_Report.pdf.
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contracts for new or incremental clean generation from within RGGI or to be imported into RGGI27;
and/or (4) aid/incentivize customers to invest in more energy efficiency, demand response, or distributed
energy to lower their overall electricity purchase needs. One additional way that LSEs could be permitted
to comply with RGGI is through purchasing extra RECs (voluntarily, beyond those required for RPS
compliance, to the extent that these are available and cheaper than comparable allowance purchases).
Again, though, as noted supra, most—if not all—RGGI states include in their Renewable Portfolio
Standards some methods of generation that are “renewable” but not carbon-free, and it may be impossible
to easily differentiate “zero emissions” RECs from carbon-emitting RECs. Accordingly, states should
consider whether and how they want to allow voluntary additional REC purchases to count for
compliance with RGGI.
We would expect that strategy (2)—shifting from wholesale purchases to bilateral contracts with inregion generation—might prove popular until it was exhausted as an option, as this would likely be the
lowest cost compliance strategy. LSEs are essentially “takers” in the ISO wholesale markets,28 such that
they cannot make special requests regarding the characteristics or price of the wholesale electricity they
receive.29 Therefore, when purchasing general “system power” from the wholesale market, LSEs will
have to pay the wholesale price both for in-region generation and imports, and then, under imports
regulations, will need to purchase allowances for the imports’ emissions. Accordingly, in-region power—
that can be identified as such through a bilateral contract and therefore carries no compliance obligation
for the LSE30—will be cheaper power, from an LSE’s perspective, because it will not have to purchase
allowances to accompany such power, as it would have to do for system power.31 For this reason, we can
envision that there may well be a shift away from wholesale market purchases towards in-region bilateral
contracts.

27

This generation could be renewable and thus perfectly clean from a RGGI viewpoint, or it could simply be
cleaner than the systems mix, in which case there would still be some allowance obligation, but a smaller one. In
the case where RGGI compliance entities enter into bilateral contracts to purchase new renewable generation, care
will need to be taken to ensure that the RECs generated from such sources are appropriately retired, in order to avoid
double-counting.
28
LSEs do have some ability to hedge against market price fluctuations by entering bilateral contracts, but this
ability would not allow them to demand specific types of wholesale power, or price differentials, as a result of
having a RGGI compliance obligation imposed.
29
We assume here that LSE compliance obligations are therefore unlikely to have major direct influences on
wholesale market prices, but have not found any analysis to confirm this point.
30
We assume here that the limitation on specified contracts would not extend to in-region contracts between a RGGI
generator and a RGGI LSE, as these would not qualify as contracts for “imports.” However, limitations on specified
contracts could be crafted to apply to in-region contracts as well, eliminating this compliance option.
31
It may be helpful to explain this through some basic equations. Remember that in-region power carries zero
emissions obligations for the LSE because the generator has already purchased allowances. Wholesale system
power, on the other hand, has emissions obligations at the level of the adjusted residual mix, represented below by X
tons/MWh.
For every megawatt-hour of in-region power an LSE purchases through a bilateral contract, the Total Price =
contract price + $0 in allowance obligations.
In contrast, if the LSE buys a megawatt-hour of system power, the Total Price =wholesale price + X tons/MWh *
allowance price/ton = wholesale price + X(allowance price).
Accordingly, unless there is a major divergence between the contract price and the wholesale price per megawatt
hour, bilateral contracting is likely to be cheaper because it carries no allowance obligations.
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Of course, the extent to which this happens will depend on many factors. In some RGGI states, state
law may constrain the extent to which certain providers—particularly default service providers32—can
enter into bilateral contracts that pay any price higher than the “best price” available “in light of market
conditions.” 33 These rules might prevent such providers from bilaterally contracting with in-region
generators at higher prices that factor in the cost of allowances. Those states will have to consider
whether to amend state law to allow for this compliance strategy. If a shift to bilateral contracting is not
available to certain market participants, then there may be limited short-term compliance options aside
from simply purchasing allowances to accompany wholesale power purchases—a strategy likely to be
costly to consumers without sending any short-term signals about the value of cleaner power to out-ofstate generators. Additional variables that might impact the extent to which bilateral contracts are
employed as a compliance strategy include RGGI’s price impact on wholesale markets, the stringency of
the adjusted residual mix applied to an LSE, the relative competitiveness and availability of renewable
generation and demand-side investment opportunities in the short term, and the extent to which LSEs feel
pressure to minimize compliance costs. The incentives to move to bilateral contracting (if permitted by
state law) would likely be most acute in PJM states, as these states would face the highest adjusted
residual mix and rely on the wholesale market for a large amount of their power.34 In the longer term,
LSEs might increasingly respond to imports regulations by purchasing new, cleaner generation in and
outside of RGGI and by undertaking all cost-effective demand reduction strategies.35 This, of course,
well serves the underlying objectives of RGGI.
As a practical matter, it bears noting that this predicted consequence of imports regulations—a shift
from wholesale market purchases to bilateral contracts with in-region generation, thereby causing inregion generation to exit the wholesale market—might prove unpopular with non-RGGI generators
selling into the wholesale market (as it would tend to lower wholesale prices back down, to the extent
RGGI generators raised prices). More generally, it may strike some as perverse if RGGI ends up
incentivizing significant exit from the competitive wholesale markets that FERC has spent the past two
decades attempting to construct. Whether or not this resistance might lead to a successful legal challenge
is, however, a separate question, and one that we take up in the next Part.36 Importantly, FERC has
endorsed bilateral contracting as perfectly compatible with wholesale markets, and indeed requires

32

States that have restructured typically require the previously regulated utility to provide default service, also
sometimes also referred to as provider of last resort or standard offer service, to customers who choose not to switch
to a new retail supplier. See, e.g., MD. PUB. UTILITIES CODE § 7-510(c)(2).
33
See, e.g., MD. PUB. UTILITIES CODE § 7-510(c)(4)(ii).
34
However, application of an assumption that Maryland and Delaware sales into the wholesale market were
consumed by in-state generators would mitigate this effect.
35
Presumably, although the details would vary based on particular states’ rules, more demand side measures would
meet Public Utility Commission tests for “cost-effectiveness” if there were an imports compliance obligation placed
on LSEs.
36
It has also been noted to us that some LSEs might object to the proposed scheme on fairness grounds, depending
upon the geography and distribution of resources of a state. For example, from a physical resource perspective,
upstate New York typically imports hydropower, whereas downstate New York imports from PJM. However, under
the proposed imports regulations, all of these imports would be assigned an equal adjusted residual mix, to the
extent that they occurred through the wholesale market. Flexibility in the rules regarding the ways in which historic
specified contracts can be identified might alleviate some of these concerns.
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ISOs/RTOs to dedicate a portion of their websites to creating a “bulletin board” to facilitate long-term
bilateral contracting in organized markets. 37
Another set of effects worth considering are those on non-RGGI generators and states. In general, we
expect these effects to be relatively small as compared to the in-region effects because, as explained,
LSEs are by and large price-takers in the regional markets. They therefore do not have a lot of leverage to
require out-of-RGGI generators to change their prices or generation methods. While an adjusted residual
mix will be applied to imports, the out-of-state generators will not feel this burden directly, as the imports
obligation will occur on the retail side of the wholesale market, with the major costs likely passed on to
RGGI consumers. We thus can hypothesize only one way in which out-of-region generation might feel
an immediate impact of imports regulations: those out-of-state generators with a generation mix cleaner
than what is assumed by the adjusted residual mix might wish to contract with RGGI LSEs to sell their
power at a premium over the going rate for system power, but might be prevented from doing so by
RGGI’s limitations on what power is allowed to achieve “specified” status. In the longer run, imports
regulations should cause out-of-region generators to face increased competition from new renewable
generation and/or demand-side solutions, but this would prove equally the case for in-RGGI generation.38
III.

LEGAL PERMISSIBILITY OF OUTLINED SCHEME

Having laid out the broad details of how imports regulations might function in practice, we now turn
to the issue of whether this scheme would survive a challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause (the
“DCC”) or Federal Power Act preemption.
a. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
i. OVERVIEW
The precedent surrounding (and creating) the DCC is often criticized as quite messy, but its basic
tenet is well-settled: states may not engage in “economic protectionism” by enacting “regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”39 The
first question a court asks when examining a law under the DCC is whether or not the law is
discriminatory. A few particulars about this test are worth noting. A law can discriminate either on its
face, in its purpose, or in practical effect.40 If so, such a law is considered “virtually per se” invalid.41

37

See 125 FERC ¶ 61,071, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, at ¶ 281 (Oct. 17,
2008) (“The Commission did not find that there is a fundamental problem with long-term contracting for electric
power, either inside or outside of organized markets.”). Although the order references long-term contracting, FERC
explained that it also permitted RTOs and ISOs to include offers for shorter-term (less than one year) contracts on
their websites. Id. at ¶ 301.
38
One final possible effect of imports regulations is that LSEs might strive to bifurcate or segment wholesale power
markets. For example, LSEs might request of their ISOs to be able to specifically purchase only in-region power, or
to negotiate price differentials for in- versus out-of-region power. This paper does not consider the additional
constitutional risks posed by this hypothetical compliance strategy.
39
Dep’t of Rev. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008) (internal quotation omitted).
40
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
41
Davis, 553 U.S. at 338. Nominally, a “strict scrutiny” standard applies, meaning that in rare circumstances, courts
will uphold a discriminatory law as justified in terms of legitimate “local benefits” and the “unavailability of
Footnote continued on next page
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“Discrimination” in this context refers to “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”42
As suggested by the above-quoted sentence, to fail the discrimination inquiry, a law must do
more than merely place some burden on out-of-state economic interests—it must have a protectionist
motivation or effect. Laws that do not clearly favor in-state interests are judged under the more lenient
test articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.43 The Pike balancing test provides that an even-handed
regulation with some effect on out-of-state commerce may be upheld so long as (1) it effectuates a
legitimate local public interest; and (2) its incidental impacts on interstate commerce do not impose a
burden that is clearly in excess of the putative local benefits.44
A law will also be struck down if it is deemed an extraterritorial regulation.45 Laws that fail this
extraterritoriality inquiry are those that attempt to “directly control[] commerce occurring wholly outside
the boundaries of a State.”46 In deciding whether a statute regulates extraterritorially, courts consider the
consequences of the statute itself and the effects that would arise if many states adopted similar
legislation.47
We consider below how arguments against LSE-centered imports regulations under each of the
above-outlined prongs of the DCC might fare.
ii. DISCRIMINATION
Opponents of imports regulations might challenge them as discriminatory on their face, in purpose, or
in effect. To avoid a finding of purposive discrimination, regulators should avoid imputing any
protectionist motivation to the regulations. For example, regulators would want to avoid any suggestion
that imports regulations were motivated by a desire to have more of the electricity that is consumed
within RGGI come from within the region. Instead, imports regulations should be defended as necessary
for RGGI to regulate all power consumed in the RGGI region evenhandedly. Anticipating a need to
defend the program legally, it may be advisable to memorialize agreement among the RGGI states on the
purposes of imports regulations.
As a general matter, we believe that a goal-oriented, geography-neutral justification for imports
regulations should pass muster as non-discriminatory. Under current RGGI rules, not all CO2 emissions
associated with electricity consumed in RGGI states are accounted for. By placing a burden only on inregion electricity generators, RGGI has allowed in-region consumers of fossil fuel-fired electricity that is
imported into the RGGI region to have essentially a “free pass.” This loophole creates perverse incentives
for retail suppliers of electricity to import cheap, high-emitting electricity and prevents participating states
Footnote continued from previous page

nondiscriminatory alternatives” that would effectuate the statute’s goals. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
42
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
43
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
44
Id. at 142.
45
See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
46
Id.
47
Id.
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from being able to fully account for and reduce the CO2 emissions associated with electricity consumption
in their states. Ultimately, this regulatory gap risks undermining RGGI’s goal of reducing Signatory
States’ CO2 emissions.48 Imports regulations should therefore be defensible as necessary to force inregion consumers to bear the costs of—and ultimately reduce—the emissions associated with the
electricity they consume, irrespective of that electricity’s origin.
However, a DCC analysis of imports regulations must necessarily address the fact that electricity is
more complicated to regulate than traditional products, like apples49 or milk cartons.50 As explained
above, the complex design of the electricity system necessitates that imports regulations impose certain
requirements on imports that are avoided in the case of regulating in-state generation. In this way, pure
equality of treatment between in-state and imported electricity is impossible.51 Under the outlined scheme,
imported electricity will bear two burdens that in-state generators do not: (1) an adjusted residual mix
applied to electricity LSEs import into the RGGI region, and (2) a limit on what contracts can achieve
“specified” status and therefore escape having the adjusted residual mix applied. Nevertheless, we do not
think these differences in treatment are likely to be found to amount to discrimination, for the reasons
explained below.
1. Facial Discrimination
A challenge of facial discrimination would argue that because imports regulations apply by their
terms only to imported power, they facially discriminate based on origin. But acceptance of this argument
would require myopia regarding the overall design of the RGGI scheme, which imposes equivalent
burdens on in-state generation. We think it unlikely that a court would decide to look at imports
regulations in isolation from the larger RGGI scheme. This principle is well supported by Supreme Court
precedent:
The question of constitutional validity is not to be determined by artificial standards.
What is required is that state action, whether through one agency or another, or through
one enactment or more than one, shall be consistent with the restrictions of the Federal
Constitution. There is no demand in that Constitution that the state shall put its
requirements in any one statute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in
its totality, is within the state's constitutional power.52
48

The concept/threat of “leakage” can be used here to bolster the claim that imports regulations are a necessary
component of RGGI’s cap-and-trade scheme. Any modeling showing that RGGI’s emissions reductions will be
eroded without imports regulations will be helpful in demonstrating why imports regulations are critical to the
program’s integrity. RGGI might further assert that it cannot meet its goal of serving as a viable model of a capand-trade program if it does not produce real cuts in CO2 emissions.
49
Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
50
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
51
This sentence slightly overstates the case. It would be possible to treat in-region and out-of-region identically if
RGGI chose to shift entirely to a load-based approach to regulation, where Load Serving Entities were responsible
for the emissions associated with all power consumed by their customers, such that in-region generators had no
compliance obligations. We have not considered the political or practical feasibility of this option, although it has
certain appeal for streamlining the legal analysis.
52
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1932). Cf. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
190-91 (1994) (refusing to analyze separately a state tax scheme that applied even-handedly to all milk producers,
and a state subsidy given from these proceeds only to in-state milk producers, as independent regulations).
Footnote continued on next page
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Similar reasoning obtained in a 1982 Supreme Court case examining Nebraska groundwater regulations
that applied only to interstate water transfers. As the Court explained, although “Commerce clause
concerns [were] implicated” by the regulation’s focus only on interstate transfers, this facially differential
treatment would not be unconstitutional if the same restrictions were also applied in intrastate transfers:
“Obviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not
discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out
of the State. An exemption for interstate transfers would be inconsistent with the ideal of evenhandedness
in regulation.”53
Even, however, assuming that a court views imports and in-state obligations in conjunction, there is a
further challenge that might also be framed as a “facial” challenge, based on the fact that imports alone
would bear the obligations of an adjusted residual mix and limitations on “specified” contracts.
Opponents would likely argue that these differences violate the “ideal of evenhandedness.”
A court might view these differences in imports’ treatment as enough, standing alone, to subject the
scheme to strict scrutiny. But we think RGGI should have a valid argument that although imports
regulations necessarily place different limitations on out-of-state power, these do not impermissibly
disadvantage out-of-state power, but instead are structurally necessary components of imposing evenhanded obligations on in- and out-of state power. There is scant case law squarely addressing the
question of whether it is permissible for a law to treat out-of-state products differently, as long as there is
no disadvantage as compared to in-state products. (This dearth of case law is likely attributable to the fact
that for most products other than electricity, there are no complex physical attributes that would
necessitate doing so.) However, the way the facial discrimination inquiry is framed supports the premise
that it is permissible. For example, the Supreme Court recently laid out the contours of the facial
discrimination inquiry as follows:
To determine whether a law violates this so-called ‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce
Clause, we first ask whether it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce. In
this context, discrimination simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-ofstate economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. 54
This language suggests that facially differential treatment alone does not establish discrimination—there
must also be a disparate burden.

Footnote continued from previous page

Analogies to the compensatory tax doctrine might also offer RGGI support on this point (even if, strategically,
RGGI does not want to be labeled a tax). That doctrine permits a state to enact a tax that might on its face be
discriminatory, so long as it can show that in-state entities already bear an equivalent burden. See Or. Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102-04. Similarly, it should be permissible for a regional capand-trade program to place obligations on imported power so long as in-region generation already bears an
equivalent burden. Cf. Heddy Bolster, The Commerce Clause Meets Environmental Protection: The Compensatory
Tax Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L. REV. 737 (2006)
(concluding, slightly differently from our analysis, that a court would likely find imports regulations to be facially
discriminatory, but suggesting that they could be saved by the compensatory tax doctrine).
53
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 955-56 (1982) (emphasis added).
54
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).
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In the case of imports regulations, it is not readily apparent whether application of an adjusted
residual mix, coupled with a limit on specified contract status, actually disadvantages out-of-state
generators, as compared to the generator-based compliance obligation placed on in-state sources. For this
reason, we think that any “facial” challenge to imports regulations would probably merge with an “in
effects” challenge. To properly analyze this issue, a court would have to look to the potential effects of
the restrictions—an inquiry to which we turn in the next subsection.
2. Discrimination in Effect
More complex to analyze is an in-effect challenge, which would argue that the differential treatment
required for imports amounts to discrimination because it would, in practice, disadvantage out-of-state
generation. However, we see no strong argument—at least ex ante—that the scheme would in fact harm
out-of-staters while benefiting in-staters.55
Critically, discrimination under the DCC requires not just differential treatment, but also a
protectionist motivation or outcome.56 An in-effect challenge could therefore prevail only if it showed
that the burdens placed on imports (out-of-state generation) 57 would work to the benefit of in-state
generation, or had the purpose of doing so.
We do not believe this should be the case. Based on our envisioned potential effects, three possible
arguments present themselves. An opponent might first argue that any shift in LSE purchasing towards
bilateral contracts with in-region generation instead of wholesale purchases would constitute a benefit to
in-state generation. But even if this occurs to a notable degree—and we are not sure if it will (particularly
given that state law may constrain this purchasing strategy in certain states, and for certain entities)—it
does not necessarily mean that the overall percentage of in-state purchases would increase.58 And if the
55

It is worth noting that an early constitutional challenge to RGGI’s imports regulations would probably take the
form of a “facial challenge,” instead of an “as-applied” challenge, as it likely will require some amount of time
before the impacts of imports regulations are borne out. “A ‘facial challenge,’ as opposed to an ‘as-applied
challenge,’ does not seek to analyze the impact of a statute against the factual context of the case; rather, it seeks to
invalidate a statute as unconstitutional on the basis of its text.” Gage O’Grady, The Role of Speculation in Facial
Challenges, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 867, 869 (2011). RGGI should have an easier time defending a facial challenge
alleging “discrimination in effect,” as courts are loathe to engage in too much speculation regarding what the
potential consequences of a scheme might be. See id. at 881-83.
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analysis would like compare how in-state generators and out-of-state generators fare under imports regulations, even
though the compliance obligation for imports regulations would fall on in-region LSEs. See Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).
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Many RGGI are states currently net importers, so may not have considerably more in-region generation to deploy.
However, if RGGI states are net importers for economic reasons but have unused in-state capacity, an imports
obligation might make this capacity economic again. But any tendency in this direction should be counterbalanced:
if RGGI turns towards bilateral contracting with in-state generators, wholesale market demand would fall and the
wholesale price would also likely fall as these more expensive generators exited the market (at least if RGGI
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percentage of in- versus out-of-region power does not change, there would be no apparent protectionism
in simply shifting purchasing modes. However, if modeling suggested that imports regulations would in
fact lead to an appreciably greater dispatch of in-region power and fewer imports than would be the case
without RGGI,59 there would be a stronger argument that the regulations were discriminatory in effect.60
RGGI might consider performing some modeling to determine the extent of its risk in this regard.
Second, relatively cleaner (but non-renewable) generators outside the RGGI region might argue that
the imports regulations unfairly disadvantage them.61 These cleaner firms might wish to sell their power
via specified contract with RGGI LSEs in order to escape application of the adjusted residual mix, but
would be prohibited from doing so by resource shuffling rules.62 But this result should not constitute
discrimination. Most importantly, it would be difficult for these cleaner firms to argue that they are
disadvantaged as compared to in-RGGI generators. In-region generators have to purchase allowances to
account for their emissions—a burden that out-of-region clean generators do not have to shoulder. In this
way, an LSE-centered imports scheme still “advantages” all out-of-state generators sending load into
RGGI as compared to in-state sources, given that the wholesale market will shield out-of-staters from any
direct transmittal of compliance costs upstream (as explained supra section II).63 The only real burden
out-of-region cleaner generators face is that they are not able to take advantage of the price differentials
created by RGGI for clean versus non-clean power, such that they are treated the same as their dirtier outof-state counterparts, who, in turn, benefit from being lumped together with the cleaner out-of-state firms.
But it is unlikely that this “lumping together” of out-of-state firms, although arguably unfortunate, would
rise to the level of discrimination. The Supreme Court held in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland that
the dormant Commerce Clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms,” explaining
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net exporters, whether the percentage of in-state consumption coming from in-state generation would change
depends upon the amount and sources of power currently exchanged across these state borders in both directions.
The complex interactions at play here suggest that this might be an area where further study is warranted.
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RGGI’s timeline for adopting imports regulations might complicate the use of modeling as proof of
discrimination. In particular, if there has been a shift toward more imports during the early years of the program
when imports regulations have not been in place, then models showing that imports regulations would increase inregion generation at the expense of imports should not necessarily be taken as evidence of discrimination. Rather,
any changes that imports regulations cause in the balance of in-region generation versus imports should arguably be
compared to the projected quantity of electricity imports that would exist in a hypothetical market without RGGI
(or, perhaps, to the amount of electricity imports pre-RGGI, although much has changed in the markets since this
time).
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Cf. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. 12-cv-01286 (D. Md., complaint filed Apr. 27, 2012) (alleging that
Maryland’s requirement that its LSEs enter into contracts with certain generators violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by favoring new generating facilities located in Maryland). On the other hand, if imports regulations caused
only a small shift towards in-region generation, this effect might not necessarily prove fatal. On at least one
occasion, the Supreme Court approved of a state law even though it was clear that it would benefit one Minnesota
industry—pulpwood producers—“significantly . . . at the expense of out-of-state firms.” See Clover Leaf Creamery,
449 U.S. at 473.
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Potentially aggrieved firms would most likely be cleaner, but non-renewable, generators, as the latter have the
renewable nature of their generation compensated through RECs, which are excluded from the adjusted residual
mix.
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Resource shuffling rules might permit some of these contracts to proceed, to the extent they could qualify as
“specified” based on proven historical relationships with RGGI LSEs.
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At least, this out-of-state advantage holds so long as the differential between the wholesale market price and the
price paid for in-region bilateral contracts is less than the full cost of the associated allowances.
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that “[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”64 Circuit courts have frequently cited
Exxon in upholding state laws that have negative impacts on particular firms, so long as the interstate
market as a whole, as compared to the in-state market, is not disadvantaged. In the case of imports
regulations, because the adjusted residual mix would be, by definition, an average, it should benefit some
firms while burdening others. Under Exxon’s logic, such a shift in comparative advantage among out-ofstate firms should not amount to discrimination against interstate commerce.65 Nevertheless, to limit
claims along these lines by cleaner out-of-state generators, RGGI again may want to consider affording
broad flexibility to LSEs to demonstrate historical bilateral contracts with out-of-state generators.
Third, the design of imports regulations may require making an assumption that Maryland and
Delaware consume their generation sold into the wholesale market in-state, even where this cannot be
directly tracked. If this assumption is made, these generators would be removed from calculation of the
PJM adjusted residual mix, making the mix “dirtier” and potentially raising objections from out-of-state
generators. The fact that PJM’s geography requires making this assumption does perhaps lend an air of
artificiality to the calculations of “emissions resulting from imports” into Maryland and Delaware and
might cause a court to scrutinize the issue more closely. Again, though, differential treatment alone is not
impermissible. We still do not see imposition of this assumption as readily leading to a strong argument
of protectionism. The power exempted from the adjusted residual mix calculation would still be subject
to a RGGI compliance obligation, such that in- and out-of-region power would still receive equal
treatment. And indeed, these assumptions might actually create less of an incentive for Maryland and
Delaware LSEs to move towards in-state bilateral contracting in place of wholesale market purchases (if
state law were to permit this as a compliance option).
In sum, we see no strong argument that the differential burdens necessarily placed on out-of-region
generators through imports regulations would be protectionist, and therefore discriminatory, in nature.
Accordingly, we believe a court would be correct to find that the burdens placed on interstate commerce
are incidental ones that are properly analyzed under Pike balancing (an analysis to which we turn infra
Section III(a)(4)).
However, a few words of caution are in order. First, the argument that RGGI is only seeking “equality
of treatment” between in- and out-of-state electricity might be complicated by the fact that RGGI adopted
in-state requirements several years before it would adopt imports requirements. We do not think this
timeline is fatal, but RGGI might think carefully about how to justify the regulations as necessary at this
point in time, even though they were ostensibly considered unnecessary earlier. It may be helpful to draw
64

437 U.S. 117, 126-28 (1978).
See also, e.g., Wine And Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Exxon
in explaining that the fact that the challenged state laws “may have had a negative impact on [plaintiff’s] business
model is, in itself, insufficient to show discriminatory effect”); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum
Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 827 (3d. Cir. 1994) (“[T] he fact that a law may have devastating economic consequences on a
particular interstate firm is not sufficient to rise to a Commerce Clause burden.” (internal quotations omitted)); Ford
Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 944 (3d. Cir. 1989) (quoting Exxon in explaining that “[a]s the
Supreme Court has noted, ‘[t]he Commerce Clause [does not] protect[ ] the particular structure or method of
operation in a retail market.... the Clause protects the interstate market, not the particular interstate firms, from
prohibitive or burdensome regulations.’” (emphasis and second and third alterations in Ford)); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 213 (2d. Cir. 2003) (same).
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on the concept of “leakage” of emissions, particularly as RGGI’s cap is tightened, as one concern now
motivating imports regulations.
RGGI might also want to consider whether to amend its definitions in order to strengthen claims of
even-handed treatment of in-state and out-of-state electricity. For example, California does not place a
separate compliance obligation on imports, but instead applies its general cap-and-trade regulations to all
“first deliverers of electricity”—those entities which first deliver power into the California grid. This
category includes, by definition, in-state generators, LSEs, and wholesale power marketers.66 While
RGGI may have technical reasons for opting for LSE regulations rather than a first deliverer model, it
might consider whether it can still craft a definition of “covered entities” that naturally includes LSEs and
in-state generators, rather than crafting separate compliance obligations for LSEs. Although arguably just
a matter of semantics or framing, beginning from a place of even-handedness within the regulatory
definitions might better showcase the equality of treatment between imports and in-state generation.
Finally, no discussion of imports regulations’ constitutional vulnerability would be complete without
reference to the case of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (“RMFU”), which is pending in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.67 That case considers the permissibility under the DCC of California’s
low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), which the district court struck down on multiple grounds.68 The LCFS
requires suppliers of transportation fuels in California to meet annual “carbon intensity” targets.69 On the
issue of discrimination, the district court found California’s LCFS to be facially discriminatory on the
ground that the standard’s design treated Midwest corn-derived ethanol differently from similar cornderived ethanol made in California, by assigning Midwest ethanol higher carbon intensity based on
the location of the production facility and the distance the product traveled.70 On appeal, appellants
argued that this ruling fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the LCFS, which is designed to treat
all products equally based on a lifecycle analysis of carbon content.71 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling (and
perhaps subsequent consideration by the Supreme Court) will likely have a major impact in shaping how
the DCC is applied to the novel field of state carbon regulation.72
iii. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The second legal hurdle that imports regulations will have to clear is the DCC’s prohibition on
extraterritorial regulation. Similar to claims made in RMFU, opponents of imports regulations might
argue that the goal of the regulations would be to lower out-of-region generators’ GHG emissions, such
that imports regulations are just a ploy to regulate indirectly these wholly out-of-state emissions that
66
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See RMFU, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
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section.
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2012, Doc. No. 63).
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RGGI states could not regulate directly. We believe acceptance of this argument would require an overly
expansive reading of the doctrine of extraterritoriality. This element of the dormant commerce clause
inquiry is, however, considerably less clear and well-developed than the discrimination inquiry.73
Extraterritoriality applies where a regulation “directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside
the boundaries of a State.”74 This statement is broad enough to leave questions as to precisely what is
forbidden. One leading scholar suggests that it is commonly “understood only to constrain a state from
formally asserting legal authority outside its borders.”75 In accord with this view, the Second Circuit has
made clear that a “[m]ere ‘upstream pricing impact’ is not a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause,
even if the impact is felt out-of-state where the stream originates.”76 There is space to argue that the
Supreme Court also endorsed a narrow understanding of the doctrine in the 2003 case Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, where it readily dismissed an extraterritorial challenge
upon finding that Maine was not dictating out-of-state prices.77 However, Walsh does not treat the issue
of extraterritoriality at length.
Importantly, courts have often upheld laws that require changes in out-of-state behavior in order to
access the in-state market, as long as they do not exert direct control over the way that commerce must be
conducted outside of state boundaries. For example, the Supreme Court upheld Minnesota’s law requiring
milk distributors to change their packaging from plastic to paper if they wanted to continue selling within
that state; and more recently, the Second Circuit upheld a Vermont law requiring manufacturers to label
all lamps sold in that state.78 Even though these laws required actual changes in physical practices by outof-state manufacturers, they were permissible because they did not dictate the terms by which out-of-state
commerce had to occur for products not entering the Minnesota or Vermont marketplace, respectively.79
Under this line of extraterritoriality analysis, we believe imports regulations would be on relatively
solid footing. RGGI imports regulations operate at a further level of remove than either the Minnesota or
Vermont laws mentioned above. Imports regulations place compliance obligations on RGGI LSEs in an
effort to control and reduce in-state consumption. There are no compliance obligations placed on out-of73

See, e.g., Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality
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Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
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Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38, 67 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Freedom
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See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the fact that
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region generators, nor are there any strictures placed on how out-of-region generators produce power.
Accordingly, out-of-state generators would not be required to alter their practices in any way as a result of
these regulations—even for that power being sent into the RGGI region.
However, the district court in RMFU applied a more stringent interpretation of extraterritoriality.
That court found that because California’s LCFS would incentivize the alteration of land use practices
and electricity generation choices outside of the state—albeit through indirect means—it was
impermissibly extraterritorial.80 In its view, the critical factor appeared to be that California was
attempting to change out-of-state production methods, rather than actual chemical or physical product
characteristics.81
If this prohibition on incentivizing changes to out-of-state manufacturing processes is upheld on
appeal and is applied by a court reviewing imports regulations, RGGI might be more vulnerable to an
extraterritoriality challenge. There is little precedent on the issue of whether regulation that changes the
manufacturing methods of products entering a state, rather than product characteristics, is acceptable.82
But there is room for distinguishing imports regulations as operating at an even further level of remove
than the California LCFS. Although imports regulations require LSEs to reduce consumption of GHG
emitting electricity, they are agnostic as to how LSEs go about reducing that consumption and LSEs have
many compliance options (outlined above in Section II). In turn, LSE compliance choices might
influence ISO/RTO wholesale market prices for power and the prices that LSEs are willing to pay for
specified imported power. But this is as close as LSE-centered imports regulations come to exerting
influence on out-of-state generators. Indeed, although RGGI states would no doubt like for out-of-state
generators to be incentivized to change their generation profiles, it is by no means clear that RGGI will
provide any pronounced incentives in this regard to existing out-of-state generators, at least in the short
term (given that the wholesale market acts as a mitigator of in- versus out-of-RGGI power prices). This is
a distinction between an LSE-centered scheme and one that more directly places compliance obligations
on importers (such as California’s first-deliverer policy).83 Instead of sending direct price signals, an LSE
scheme will incentivize a slower change in the kinds of power generation that will be valued going
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forward. In contrast, because California’s LCFS applied directly to fuel providers, there was a more
direct linkage among the requirements, compliance options, and out-of-state manufacturing processes.
Therefore, we believe that even under a relatively stringent interpretation of extraterritoriality,
imports regulations’ extraterritorial effects are arguably too contingent to support a finding of
extraterritoriality. Any effects felt by out-of-state generators will depend on the strength of a price signal
effect transmitted slowly upstream via LSE compliance strategies—a relatively benign out-of-state impact
compared with many that have previously withstood scrutiny.84
However, regulating line loss might present additional risk under extraterritoriality. Because line loss
is in part a function of distance, line-loss gross-up provisions could come dangerously close to the
regulations invalidated in RMFU, given that they would penalize imports for, in essence, being imports.
Perhaps a number could be selected that was representative of the same amount of line loss that occurred
during intra-RGGI transmission, to avoid penalizing imports for simply coming over a longer distance.
Or, it might be prudent for RGGI to opt for “good enough” imports regulations that do not account for
line loss, and thereby sidestep the thornier legal issues raised by including this factor.
The Supreme Court has also, at times, invalidated state laws as extraterritorial regulations when those
affected activities could be subjected to inconsistent regulations if many states adopted similar
legislation.85 This “Balkanization” argument might also be mounted against imports regulations, but
would be a weaker claim than the arguments explored so far. Although LSEs and generators might face
different greenhouse gas emissions compliance obligations in different states, right now this is a distant
hypothetical. This fact alone might be enough to negate a Balkanization argument, as some courts require
a showing of “actual conflict.”86 Moreover, the very fact that RGGI is a regional program might help it
defend a Balkanization argument—in a sense, RGGI itself prevents Balkanization by harmonizing the
efforts of the participating states. And finally, if a court were to consider the possibility of hypothetical
conflicting regulations, RGGI might express willingness to work with any states adopting their own
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade (or equivalent) programs to ensure that power imported into the RGGI
region was not “double-counted.” RGGI might include in any agreement on imports regulations a
paragraph explicitly expressing willingness to do this.
iv. PIKE BALANCING
If imports regulations pass a discrimination inquiry, they will be analyzed under Pike balancing.
Pike provides that “where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”87 By surviving
a discrimination inquiry, imports regulations would show themselves to be even-handed regulations with
84
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only incidental effects on interstate commerce.88 Therefore, the Pike balancing analysis would focus on
whether they effectuated a legitimate interest without excessively burdening interstate commerce.89 It is
somewhat difficult to predict exactly how a court will approach the fact- and values-intensive inquiry
required, 90 but the burden and standard of proof favor defendants: in order to strike down a law, a
plaintiff must show that the burden imposed on interstate commerce would clearly exceed the local
benefits derived from it.91
The Pike inquiry begins with whether or not there is a legitimate local interest at stake. This should
not be difficult for RGGI to establish. The Supreme Court has confirmed that states have a legitimate
interest in guarding against the environmental risks posed by climate change.92
It remains, then, to analyze the benefits as compared to the burdens of imports regulations. The
justification for imports regulations – the “benefit”—would be something along the lines of “even-handed
treatment of all electricity consumed in the RGGI region, irrespective of origin, to account for and reduce
participating states’ greenhouse gas emissions.”93 RGGI could further assert that RGGI states would be
less successful in lowering their carbon emissions absent imports regulations. Drawing on the concept of
“leakage,” RGGI could explain that, absent imports regulations, LSEs would likely turn to purchasing
more high-emitting power from out of state, thereby offsetting emissions reductions achieved in the
region.
Opponents might try to negate the claimed benefits by making the argument that none of this
evidence matters, because state action alone cannot save participating states from the harms of climate
change, such that RGGI does not produce a real benefit. RGGI states’ strongest response is that RGGI is
their contribution to solving a global problem, adopted partly with the hope and expectation that it will
spur additional action elsewhere. Massachusetts v. EPA supports the positions that states have a special
interest in preventing the harms associated with climate change, even though the problem is a global one,
and that even a small contribution to the solution to a global problem is a valid exercise of governmental
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authority.94 However, this special state interest has not yet specifically been recognized in the Pike
balancing context.
Separate from this issue, there have been some questions raised about the amount of evidence RGGI
would need in order to demonstrate the necessity of imports regulations. Importantly, Pike speaks in
terms of “putative local benefits,”95 which courts generally interpret to require only a demonstration that
the benefits are not “illusory.”96 Accordingly, while RGGI would ideally have some basic modeling
showing how and why leakage might occur, there should not be a need for data-intensive proof of imports
regulations’ particular contribution to ensuring RGGI’s environmental integrity. Similarly, there should
not be a need for a state-specific showing of “leakage”—RGGI should be able to argue persuasively that
because it is a regional market, “leakage” at any junction would have effects that redounded throughout
the market.
These benefits must be weighed against out-of-state burdens. As noted earlier, out-of-state power
would face two burdens above and beyond in-region generation97: (1) an adjusted residual mix applied to
electricity LSEs import into the RGGI region, and (2) a limit on what contracts can achieve “specified”
status, in order to prevent resource shuffling.
To carry the day, opponents of imports regulations would bear the burden of proving that these
restrictions are “clearly excessive” when compared to the benefits imports regulations would provide.
This would be a difficult—though not impossible—argument to win. RGGI has a strong argument for
why these two particular burdens are necessary in order to prevent gaming that could otherwise
undermine their system.98 Unless faced with a particularly unsympathetic judge, it seems unlikely that
these burdens would be found clearly excessive to RGGI’s benefits as a regional solution to the pressing
problem of climate change.99 Importantly, out-of-state generators would be able to freely continue selling
electricity into RGGI, via the wholesale market and bilateral contracts.100 Moreover, compliance burdens
would fall on in-region LSEs, such that out-of-state generators would not have to do anything in order to
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comply with the scheme. But again, the outcome of a Pike inquiry can be difficult to predict, and courts
have not yet applied a balancing test to state measures to reduce the global problem of climate change.
v. STRICT SCRUTINY
If a court were to find imports regulations discriminatory, RGGI could attempt to “justify [them] both
in terms of the local benefits flowing from the [regulations] and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.” 101 However, success on these grounds is
rare.
The arguments that RGGI might make here about the program’s local benefits and imports
regulations’ necessity are quite similar to the ones it would make under Pike balancing. Accordingly, we
do not spell them out at length here. The analysis would likely turn on whether a court believed there to
be no adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives. RGGI would argue that its cap-and-trade program would
fail to achieve the central goal of capping and then reducing GHG emissions without including imports
regulations, and that cap-and-trade is an essential element of its participating states’ CO2 emissions
reductions strategies. Specifically with respect to the differential treatment of imports, RGGI could
explain that there is a “reason, apart from their origin,” that imports must be treated differently, given the
features of the interstate electricity market.102 Opponents would argue that there are many ways to
achieve CO2 emissions reductions other than a discriminatory cap-and-trade program, including
incentives, taxes, etc. While a court might side with RGGI on this point, the infrequency with which
courts uphold discriminatory statutes does not suggest that RGGI would prevail.
RGGI might consider one option to insulate itself from a fatal finding of discrimination or
extraterritoriality: it could declare its resource shuffling regulations severable from the remainder of
imports regulations. By doing so, it could protect the broad outlines of its imports regulations while
allowing a court to strike what it might view as the most problematic aspect of the rules. However, there
may be good reasons for not declaring severability, if resource shuffling regulations are critical to the
success of the scheme. It might be helpful to conduct further analysis on the extent to which the absence
of resource shuffling regulations would undermine the effectiveness of imports regulations.103
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b. FEDERAL POWER ACT
The final legal issue we analyze is preemption by the FPA. The FPA grants the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) “exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged . . . interstate
wholesale customers.”104 However, the FPA also specifies that FERC’s jurisdiction “extend[s] only to
those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”105
An FPA preemption challenge would likely assert that imports regulations are impliedly preempted
by the FPA, because they add an additional cost to any out-of-state power imported into the RGGI region
and thus directly affect wholesale electricity rates.106 We do not believe this argument would prevail.
The FPA’s reservation of some state regulatory authority provides a clear textual indication that the
drafters of the FPA did not intend for the statute to preempt all state activity in the field of electricity
regulation, even when state regulation might incidentally affect wholesale prices.107 This principle is born
out in the innumerable state environmental policies that are permissible but that certainly impact
wholesale electricity prices indirectly, including siting rules for generation, air quality standards, etc. And
indeed, FERC has made its views on this matter clear: “As a general matter, states have broad powers to
direct the planning and resource decisions of utilities under their jurisdiction. States may . . . order
utilities to purchase renewable generation . . . . [or] seek to encourage renewable or other types of
resources through their tax structure or by giving direct subsidies.”108
Imports regulations should have no more of an impact on wholesale prices than other permissible
state policies. They would not mandate a particular purchase price for certain types of wholesale
electricity.109 Instead, based on state value judgments about the importance of accounting for and
reducing the environmental consequences of electricity consumption, imports regulations would require
LSEs to acquire allowances to account for emissions from imported electricity. This allowance
requirement would, in turn, cause LSEs to change purchasing habits in order to minimize costs. These
types of incentives appear analogous to the ones generated by state RPS, which require LSEs to purchase
certain percentages of renewables and thereby indirectly impact wholesale market choices, but do not
directly dictate wholesale market prices. FERC has indicated that it believes RPS-type state policies to be
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permissible.110 We do not readily see any way to persuasively distinguish imports regulations from RPS
and similar policies, such that they might give rise to an FPA preemption claim.
We want to note here that there might be greater FPA legal risk involved if states insert themselves
into LSE compliance decision-making. That is to say, states should avoid mandating that LSEs choose
any particular method of complying with imports obligations, in order to avoid an FPA preemption
challenge alleging impermissible wholesale market interference.111 But given FERC’s consistent
endorsement of bilateral contracting as consistent with wholesale markets,112 we see no strong legal claim
that RGGI’s incentivizing a voluntary shift toward bilateral contracting—should this occur—would be
preempted by the FPA.
In sum, we are cautiously optimistic that the imports regulation scheme described in Part II would
withstand legal challenge under the DCC and under an FPA preemption challenge. Of course, however,
the cutting-edge nature of imports regulations makes them difficult to analogize to existing DCC
precedent in ways that provide any guarantees. A Ninth Circuit decision in RMFU that reinstates
California’s LCFS would make us more confident in our DCC conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Based on our analysis, we believe there is a workable and legal pathway forward for regulating
the emissions associated with imports into the RGGI region through assigning compliance obligations to
RGGI LSEs. This pathway is not without its practical complications, as it would require changes in
relevant state laws and new levels of cooperation among states, LSEs, and their RTOs/ISOs. But with
appropriate commitments from the involved parties, it can be done, if RGGI states decide that it is the
right design option to pursue. And although a legal challenge is likely, we think there is a good chance it
would not be successful, for the reasons explained above. We hope this analysis helps RGGI in its effort
to move forward in considering ways in which it might permissibly regulate imports.
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